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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Bogie's, Incorporated,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
Salt Lake County, a corporate bo<ly
politic,

10397

;

Defendant-Appellant. )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This was an action brought by a tavern owner in
Salt Lake County to l'ompel the County Licensing
Diredor to issue to it a Class B beer license and a liquor
<·ons11mplion license Tlw licenses had been refused
011 the h;tsis I Jia t applil'ahle zoning did not allmv that
~.\'llf' of h11sinesc.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LO,¥ER COURT
The case was heard upon stipulated facts, wherein
it was further stipulated that the only issue to be determined was whether Salt Lake County should be
estopped, by reason of its past failure to enforce the
zoning ordinance with respect to plaintiff's premises,
and plaintiff's reliance thereon, from refusing to relicense plaintiff's tavern, on the basis of improper zoning. Upon reciprocal motions for summary judgment,
the case was heard by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, who found that defendant was so estopped and
entered judgment for plaintiff, ordering that defendant
forthwith issue to plaintiff a cabaret license, a class B
beer license and liquor consumption license, and that
"such licenses shall continue to be issued for so long
as plaintiff remains in possession of said premises under
its present lease."

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, defendant seeks to reverse the
judgment of the lower court in its entirety and to obtain
a dismissal of the action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts upon which this case was decided are
fully set forth in the stipulation of facts appearing
in the record and will only be briefly restated here.
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Since 1058, premises located at 7263 So. State
Street aud pop11larly known as the Black Hand Tavern have been licenseJ by defendant to serve bottled
and draft beer (Class B License). On January 21,
l9fi3, plaintiff leased the premises as a tavern or cabaret,
although from July l, 1963 to June 30, 1964 the
licenses were in the name of Reba J. Clerico, who
managed the premises for plaintiff.
On or about October 1, 19G3, defendant notified
plaintiff that subsequeni licenses would not be issued
because the premises were located in a Commercial
C-2 zone, which does not allow establishments where
beer is consumed on the premises. Such premises had
been so zoned prior to the time that plaintiff leased
the premises. It is undisputed that, in view of the applicable zoning, defendant had erroneously issued licenses to plaintiff prior to June 30, 1964.
It was stipulatetl that plaintiff has made substantial improvements to said premises and is obligated
on the lease through November, 1967, for the sum of
$225.00 per month.

ARGUMENT
Point One: Defendant, by its past conduct in failing to enforce the zoning ordinances in connection with
pluintzff"s premises. is not cs topped from refusing the
plaintiff a lfr('nse to operate the premises, as in the
pas( in violation of the zoniny ordinances, and the lower

court erred in requiring defendant to issue such licenses
to plaintiff.
Defendant submits that this case is controlled by a
recent decision of this Court in Morrison v. Horne,
12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P 2d 1113 (1961).
In that case, the plaintiff had been refused a permit
to erect a service station upon property in Salt Lake
County. The property in question had been located
in a residential zone since 1953, although a small grocery store had stood on the property and the County
Assessor had, for a number of years after 1953, erroneously listed and assessed the property as commercial.
The plaintiff had purchased the property in 1960 shortly
before the store, which had been vacant since about
1955, burned down.
On appeal from a mandate requiring the county
zoning authorities to issue a building permit for construction of the service station, this Court reversed,
holding that the county was not estopped to assert the
residential zoning requirement because the assessor
had erroneously listed the property as commercial.
In doing so, the court said (p. 1114):
"As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable and
unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no authority to do so, could
bind the county to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly passed, to which everyone has notice
by its passage and publication, because a ministerial employee erred in characterizing the type
of property. The authorities generally support
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such a conclusion, and we are constrained to
and do hold that the assessor's erroneous description of the subject property as commercial does
not preclude the zoning authorities from denying the permit for the service station."
A case strikingly similar to the instant case was
Fass v. City of Highland Park, 326 Mich. 19, 39 N.W.
2d 336 ( 1949). In that case, plaintiffs for several years
had been given a permit to sell live poultry. Subsequently, when plaintiffs applied for a renewal of the
permit, it was refused on the basis that the zoning,
which had existed for a number of years, would not
allow the sale of live poultry. Plaintiffs contended that
the defendant city, by its past conduct, was estopped
from enforcing the zoning ordinance. As additional
ground for estoppel, the plaintiffs alleged that they
had purchased the property in reliance on statements
made by the city engineer that there would be no objections to the killing and sale of live poultry on the
premises. They further alleged that they had thereafter
expended the sum of $18,000 to construct and equip
the builcling.
In denying the plaintiffs' contention, the court
stated (p. 341):
"Plaintiffs' claim that the defendant mumc1pality is estopped to enforce its zoning ordi11anee against plaintiffs' property because of the
improper issuance of the building permit and
of the licenses for the years 1945, 1946, and
l \H'7, is not tenable. At the time such acts were
performed plaintiffs were charged with knowl7

edge of the restrictive pr.ovisi?.ns ~! t~e ~rdinance
as applied to property m a B2 district. Such
acts being unauthorized and in express contravention of ordinance provisions of the city, plaintiffs acquired no vested right to use their property for a purpose forbidden by law. No claim
is made that the building erected by plaintiffs,
or the equipment therein, cannot be utilized for
the transaction of a permissible business."
There are numerous decisions supporting the two
cited cases. It would accomplish little to repeat them
here, since many such cases can be found annotated in
Metzenbaum, Law on Zoning, Second Edition, Chapter
V-t, page 162 et. seg. and 1 A.L.R. 2d 338, both of
which works were cited with approval by this Court in
the Morrison case.
It is true that there have been some decisions where
estoppel has been successfully asserted in zoning cases.
However, these have been exceptional cases and are
in the distinct minority. A review of these cases will
disclose that most of them dealt with situations where
the official of the governmental agency (whose actions
were alleged to be the basis of the estoppel) acted within
his authority; albeit, perhaps erroneously. See, e. g.,
City of Dallas v. Rosenthal, 239 S. W. 2d 636 (Texas
Civ. App., 1951) ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment, 227
Iowa 324, 288 N. W. 145. In some cases the restrictive
ordinances or regulations had been passed after the
acts claimed to have constituted the estoppel occurred.
See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44
So.2d 808 (Florida, 1950) .
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Neither of the above is the situation here. The
county officials who had failed to enforce the zoning
ordinance with respect to plaintiff's property had, of
course, no authority to do so. Moreover, plaintiff took
the property and entered into the lease charged with
knowledge that the intended use was in violation of the
zoning laws .Thus, it is difficult to see how it can be
heard to say that it acted in reasonable reliance upon the
acts of the defendant's officials.
Plaintiff implies that because it has expended substantial sums to improve the property and is obligated
on the lease, it will be seriously damaged if it cannot
operate the premises as a tavern. There is, howe,'er,
no cJaim or evidence that a business allowed by the
zoning ordinance cannot be profitably operated on the
premises.
Defendant submits that under the law of this state
and the vast majority of other jurisdictions, Salt Lake
County cannot be estopped by acts of its officers beyond
their authority, and should not be estopped in this case.
Point Two: Even if defendant should be estopped
from refusing plaintiff the license requested, the order
of the court was too broad in requiring that the licenses
shall continue to be issued for so long as plaintiff remains in possession of subject premises under its present
lease.
The judgment entered by the lower court did not
rne1 ely prevent defendant from refusing licensing on
the basis of improper zoning, but required it to issue
9

such licenses for so long as plaintiff remains m possession under its present lease. Obviously this is too
broad, even assuming that plaintiff should prevail in
its main contention.
There are a number of reasons why a beer license
might be refused or terminated. The order, as it now
stands, would ostensibly prohibit defendant from refusing or terminating the plaintiff's license should it become
a nuisance or repeatedly violate other laws regarding
the sale of beer or consumption of liquor.
Even though it should be found that defendant is
estopped to raise the issue of plaintiff's violations of
the zoning ordinance, the order should be amended to
allow refusal of licensing in the event other grounds
therefor occur.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES
Salt Lake County Attorney
RALPH L. JERMAN
Deputy County Attorney
Civil Division
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